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Abstract
This article explores from a multidisciplinary and transnational historical approach the impact of  
technological change on the structure of  the telephone sector, the fruit of  advances in 
microelectronics and information technology. This problem has been studied in Spain basically 
by regulatory specialists, on the one hand, and technologists, on the other. We lack a more 
transversal analysis that puts into play the various elements that intervene. This article is intended 
to cover this gap, based on unpublished primary sources –primarily from Telefónica– as well as 
in other documents of  diverse origin. Specifically, it focuses on the role played by Spain and the 
historic telephone company (Telefónica) in the transition to the third generation of  mobile 
telephony (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System, UMTS) and gives prominence to the 
national state, to the supranational bodies –EU and International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) and companies.
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1. Second generation mobile telephony around the world
Technological change in telephony and its repercussions on service, the product in essence of  
the advances made in microelectronics and computer technology, have received a great deal of  
attention in Spain, basically from specialists in regulatory issues, on the one hand, and 
technologists, on the other1. In our opinion, what is lacking is a more cross-disciplinary 
analysis that puts the different intervening elements into play. This article is intended to cover 
this deficiency, from a multidisciplinary and transnational historical focus, based on 
unpublished primary sources – first and foremost, from Telefónica and an exceptional file 
from the Ministry of  Industry – as well as other documentation from various origins2. 
Specifically, it focuses on the role played by Spain and the country’s historic telephone 
company (Telefónica) in the transition to the third generation (Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System, UMTS) of  mobile telephony, and the leading role of  the national 
state, supranational organizations (the UE and the International Telecommunication Union, 
ITU) and companies. 
It is commonly accepted that European leadership in the development and deployment of  the 
second generation of  mobile telephony, predominantly using a system called Global System for 
Mobile Communication (GSM), did not reoccur with the adoption of  the subsequent systems. 
Indeed, the third generation in its Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) 
variant had a slow beginning as compared to the fast adoption in the USA and Asia3. Moreover, 
if  we consider the 2015 OpenSignal report, Europe did not lead the deployment of  4G, which 
was dominated by the Long Term Evolution (LTE) system, promising better, faster service and 
more extensive features4. There are discrepancies among the specialists when it comes to 
determining the causes for this situation. 
Before continuing, we would like to explain a series of  basic concepts that make it easier to 
follow the rationale. To begin with, the radio spectrum is a range of  radio frequencies used 
publicly or privately to provide basic communications services – radio, radar and mobile 
telephone services. Its condition as a finite resource determines the institutional intervention 
in its assignment, along with its enormous and growing economic importance (National Audit 
Office, 2001, p. 1). Band width generally refers to the volume of  information per unit of  time 
that a means of  transmission, for example, an Internet connection, can channel. 
Mobile telephony is based on different systems or standards, each of  which uses a certain 
protocol or language and consists of  access networks, a central network, system elements 
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1 As representative examples, see Elias, Berenguer and Mataix (2016) and Calzada and Estruch (2011), pp. 39-69, respectively.
2 As professed by leading authors, the history of mobile telephony refers to both social and political developments and to the 
emergence of new technologies, standards and systems (Lacohée, Wakeford† and Pearson, 2003, pp. 203-211).
3	 The	ITU	limits	the	official	designation	of	IMT-Advanced	to	LTE-Advanced	and	WirelessMAN-Advanced,	as	the	most	advanced	
technologies for global wireless mobile broadband communications (4G), although it recognizes that this term may also apply to 
the precursors of these technologies: LTE, WiMax and other evolved 3G systems that provide a substantial level of improvement in 
terms of performance and capacities (ITU, 2010).
4 The USA adopted different 3G systems; in parallel the FCC supported the standardization of both Qualcomm’s IS-54 and D-AMPS 
(IS-95), product of the collaboration between ATT and Motorola (Bornheim, 2001, p. 19; Glimstedt, 2017, p. 20). In the USA, 
new mobile telephony customers dramatically increased in number, drawn by the drop in prices. In 2002, in more than half the 
homes	in	the	country,	someone	was	signed	up	for	wireless	telephone	services,	a	percentage	that	more	than	doubled	the	figure	
from seven years earlier (New York Times,	November	18,	2002).	Some	authors	reject	the	pessimistic	vision	of	the	role	played	by	
Europe, stating that the price levels and the data rates provided indicate the success of 3G, as well as 4G on the other hand, 
from the perspective of consumer wellbeing (Lemstra, Cave and Bourreau, 2017, p. 11). Regarding the problems surrounding the 
3G standards, see Walke, Seidenberg and Althoff (2003); for 4G, see Medudula, Sagar and Gandhi (2016), pp. 81-85. At the end of 
2015, the global 4G connection base exceeded one billion users in 151 countries around the world (GSMA, 2016, p. 2).
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and a network architecture (ElNashar, El-saidny and Sherif, 2014)5. From the business 
perspective, mobile telephony is characterized by the high deployment costs of  the 
infrastructures and by the relative lateness in achieving suitable profitability (Lescuyer, 
2012, p. 7)6. Also noteworthy is its positive impact on economic growth, in such a way 
that a 10% increase in the mobile penetration rates increases the total productivity of  the 
factors by 4.2% (Deloitte, GSMA and CISCO, 2012, p. 2).
In terms of  the diversity of  modes, mobile telephony, the third great wave in modern 
telecommunications, after the telegraph and conventional telephone, provided an 
unimaginable opportunity for expansion for an invention that was more than a century 
old, while also constituting a tool to change the world (Klemens, 2013)7. While first 
generation mobile telephony networks offered simple analog voice telephony, the second 
generation GSM added certain data services, such as email and fax (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 
2001, p. 1). 
The successor to the analog systems adopted on a continental or national scale 
(Goldsmith, 2005, p. 595)8, GSM traces its roots back to 1982, when the European 
Conference of  Post and Telecommunications (CEPT, according to its initials in French) 
created a work group charged with developing standards for a pan-European digital 
mobile network. Fifteen signers from thirteen European countries (immediately followed 
by another five) agreed to renounce their various analog systems and launch the project 
that would become the Pan-European Digital Mobile Service (GSM), a multilateral 
convention establishing deadlines and identical conditions. The new European digital 
system was, in all reality, a network standard, and not just a product standard, and it 
therefore provided potential benefits derived from the related network externalities. It 
guaranteed efficient management of  scarce resources, good vocal quality and advanced 
features for security and data. Based on WAP (Wireless Application Protocol), it 
permitted what was still precarious access to the Internet with low data transmission 
speeds and required rates to be based on connection time. The agreement had important 
implications for the industry in the participating countries, so the battle to defend the 
5  UMTS consists of four logical blocks responsible for totally different things. The UMTS Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) is a 
chip	card	with	specific	information	about	the	user	and	an	authentication	key	for	network	access.	The	UMTS	terminal	or	mobile	
multimedia equipment delivers the stack of protocols from the radio interface, as well as the operational elements of the 
user	interface.	The	fixed	network	infrastructure	or	Radio	Access	Network	(RAN)	contains	the	installations	required	for	radio	
transmission.	As	a	long-range	network,	the	Core	Network	(CN)	transmits	a	user’s	data	to	its	respective	destination,	thanks	
to	numerous	switching	systems,	gateways	to	other	networks,	such	as	the	Integrated	Services	Digital	Network	(ISDN)	or	the	
Internet, and databases and installations for network management (Walke et al.,	2003,	p.	47).	IGI	Global	defines a protocol 
as “a special set of rules that end points in a telecommunication connection use when they communicate.”
6 In 1995, the telecommunications service market was estimated to be worth 143 billion ecus, of which 12% was generated in 
the area of mobile services. A very large increase was expected in the near future, which would increase this percentage to 
25% of the total income for the year 2000 (Girard and Gruber, 1996, pp. 1-2).
7 Expressed colloquially, “mobile telephony has launched revolutions, saved lives, destroyed relationships and, of course, 
spawned a whole new genre of utterly pointless” (The Guardian, May 6, 1986).
8	 The	first	manual	mobile	telephony	systems	were	developed	in	the	USA	in	1946;	the	Swedish	MT	A	was	the	first	automatic	
commercial system (1956). 2G standards: Advanced Mobile Phone Service (AMPS) developed by Bell Laboratories in the 
1970s,	marketed	in	the	United	States	in	1983	and	later	expanded;	the	Japanese	MCS-L1	from	NTT,	based	on	AMPS,	but	at	a	
higher frequency and including voice; the European Total Access Communication System (TACS), which operated at a higher 
frequency and with channels that had a narrower bandwidth than AMPS; with a more restricted geographical scope (roaming) 
was	the	pan-Nordic	system Nordic	Mobile	Telephone (NMT),	the	first	of	its	kind	in	the	world,	and	developed	in	a	cooperative	
effort	among	the	Scandinavian	countries,	which	made	great	efforts	towards	negotiation	and	finding	consensus	among	the	
creators	and	those	affected	by	the	new	technologies	(Mercer,	2006,	p.	113;	Goldsmith,	2005,	‎p.	595;	Papadimitriou	et	al.,	
2003,	p.	121;	Craninckx	and	Steyaert,	1998,	p.	3).	NMT	owed	its	success	to	“improved	user	comfort,	miniaturized	components	
and acceptable cost of the terminals” (Ketterling, 2004, p. 3).
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various interests became especially harsh (Conversation with Luis Lada, June 17, 2013; 
Natvig, 2004, p. 182; Selian, 2001)9. 
The second generation GSM system reached noticeable levels of  expansion and spread on a 
global scale. This success can only be explained by the cooperation, flexibility and adaptability 
on a national level, the latter being one of  the key factors of  differentiation between the 
diffusion of  the second and third generation technologies (Eskelinen, Vatne, Maskell, 
Malmberg and Hannibalsson, 2002, p. 163)10. By mid-1997, the new system had deployed 200 
networks in more than a hundred countries, with a total of  44 million subscribers. Only four 
years later, this standard was chosen by 70% of  mobile telephony subscribers (Lescuyer, 2012, 
p. 1). Five years later, under the effects of  the economic crisis, the overwhelming predominance 
of  the GSM standard around the world was maintained, with 69% of  subscribers, distantly 
followed by three other second generation systems: CDMA, with 13%; TDMA, with 10%; and 
PDC, with 3% (ITU, 2002)11. 
2. Second generation mobile telephony in Spain
Spain, a country whose mobile telephony history dates back to the early 1970s, joined the GSM 
agreement as a member outside the hard-core of  France, Germany, United Kingdom and Italy, 
and the Nordic core formed by the Scandinavian countries, with no option in the latter case to 
optimize its potential advantages12. 
Officially backed by government delegation, the historic telephone operator Telefónica 
undertook participation in all four phases anticipated to introduce the GSM system. Altogether, 
they included the revision of  specifications; acquisition activities; the development of  the 
system components, testing and implementation; and finally, the expansion of  the service13. 
According to the obligations entered into by the signing parties to focus on specific areas, it 
was undertaken to establish a commercial service in the Spanish capital and two experimental 
systems were acquired to test them in two other great events that took place in 1992: the 
Barcelona Olympics and the Seville World Expo14. 
9 In 1982, the CEPT decided to reserve the frequency bands in the area of 900 MHz for mobile cellular systems (Lembke, 2002, p. 
139).	The	GSM	participants	were	formed	by	the	four-party	group	(Germany,	France,	Italy	and	the	United	Kingdom),	the	Nordic	
group	(Denmark,	Finland,	Norway	and	Sweden)	and	the	rest	of	the	CEPT	group	(Bliksrud,	2004,	p.	198).	The	initials	GSM,	originally	
taken from the less-than-commercial name ‘Groupe Spécial Mobile’, created by the Telecommunication Commission under the 
framework of the Harmonization Committee, were maintained, but their meaning was changed to the Global System for Mobile 
Communication.	It	is	worth	remembering	the	official	impetus:	the	French	government	made	a	firm	commitment	to	GSM,	in	the	
hopes that a pan-European system would offer scale economies to industries and national service providers (U. S. International 
Trade Commission, 1993, p. 4/7).
10 It was the “right system, at the right place and the right time” (Selian, 2001), promising ‘easy ubiquity’ (Kelen, 2001, p. 188). 
The European Commission pointed out the affordable service provided to a wide market segment, the decrease in the cost of 
analog mobile telephony and the offer of a range of complementary services (European Commission, 1997, p. 103). The success of 
GSM owes to a double movement of initial interstate negotiation and the subsequent collaborative implementation following the 
agreement (Selian, 2001, pp. 5-6).
11 Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA); Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) and Personal Digital Cellular (PDC). As mechanisms 
to prevent interferences and collisions between users, CDMA is a scheme that permits different users to simultaneously share the 
available capacity of a common channel, while in the TDMA scheme, users transmit at different times, and thus the data bits are 
interspersed in the same means of communication (Muhammad, 2008, p. 1; Umar, 2004, p. 5/45).
12 Practically all the specialists cite the mobile communications for ships (1970) and automobiles (TAV) (1976) (Elias et al., 2016, 
p.	85).	Spain	could	not	benefit	from	scale	economies	in	the	production	of	mobile	terminals	because	NMT	operated	in	Spain	at	
frequencies	that	were	slightly	higher	than	those	of	the	Nordic	countries	(Gruber,	2005,	p.	91).
13 LACA, February 24, 1988.
14	 After	the	start	of	the	new	millennium,	Forum	Barcelona	2004	incorporated	the	UMTS	system	into	the	project	at	the	initiative	of	
Telefónica Movistar, in spite of the lack of suitable telephone terminals.
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The promotion of  the information superhighway in Europe provided the operator with a new 
opportunity to position itself. Different international agreements made it possible to consolidate the 
basic elements of  the new generation, particularly interoperability. In the aftermath of  this frenetic 
year 1992 referred to above, full of  international events, an agreement was reached with the four 
European operators (BT, FT, the Italian STET-ASST and the German Deutsch Bundespost 
Telekom, which a few years later would change its name to Deutsche Telekom A. G. and become 
privatized)15. Open to others, the agreement sought to develop the pilot European broadband 
network according to the ATM system (Asynchronous Transfer Mode). This culminated the efforts 
of  the European Institute for Research and Strategic Studies in Telecommunications (EURESCOM) 
to ensure the interoperability of  the networks and the dissemination of  R&D in the European 
Union as basic elements for the creation of  advanced European networks. Making the project 
possible required each operator to acquire and install ATM equipment on its respective networks, 
interconnecting them with 34 Mbit/s links (Turner, 1997, p. 51).16
From the Spanish market side, the Telefónica administration was very careful to stress that the 
ATM networks contributed the capacity for multiplexing, switching and transporting 
information in any telecommunications service, from high-speed data transmission to video 
communication17. By joining the European Multimedia Experiments in an ATM Environment 
(EMMA) project, a commitment also made by EURESCOM to promote international 
interoperability, Telefónica had access to the infrastructure of  the European ATM pilot network 
for experimentation in multimedia services. The purpose concerned the development of  
technical solutions for potential services and applications that would be supported by the future 
commercial ATM network18.
Two years after the boom of  1992, two important events occurred. Telefónica joined as a 
founding partner in the ACE 2000 Forum, on the same level as BT, Deutsche Bundespost 
Telekom, FT and STET. The aim was to exchange ideas and promote pilot experiences to 
provide new services to users. The recently created entity expected to set aside 80 billion pesetas 
(500 million ECUs) in its first year for research and development in broadband technology. 
Another 16 billion were reserved for building the pilot European network based on ATM as the 
first step towards the information superhighway in Europe. Next, seventeen European operators 
inaugurated the pilot phase of  this superhighway, aspiring to become the base for the future 
broadband RDSI, suitable for all types of  telecommunications services, but still lagging behind 
the revolutionary Internet in terms of  amplitude for its twenty million users at the time19. 
15 The name change occurred in 1995 and the company was privatized the following year (Lemstra and Melody, 2014, p. 171).
16 Started in 1991 as an important investment by European operators in public networks, the pan-European ATM Pilot program was 
formalized	by	a	memorandum	of	understanding	(MOU)	signed	on	November	12,	1992	by	five	European	operators	(BT,	Deutsche	
Telekom,	France	Telecom,	Telecom	Italia	and	Telefónica),	which	were	soon	joined	by	another	eleven	(Belgacom,	PTT	Telecom	
Nederland,	Swiss	Telecom	PTT,	Telecom	Finland,	ATC	Finland,	the	Swedish	company	Telia	AB,	the	Norwegian	Telenor	AS,	Portugal	
Telecom, Telecom Danmark, Telecom Eireann and Austrian PTT) (Rao, Uose and Luetchford, 1996, pp. 35-42); the MOU established 
the broadband telecommunications services based on ATM technology, focusing on the network interface and network management 
functions	as	a	support	for	interoperable	European	services	(Christensen-Dalsgaard,	Donnelly	and	Griffith,	1999,	p.	228).
17 LACA,	November	25,	1992.	Participation	in	ten	EURESCOM	projects,	worth	24	million	pesetas	in	1991 (ACE, October 30, 1991).
18 ACE, June 29, 1994; Eurescom, P460SI EMMA - European Multimedia Experiments in an ATM Environment. The information 
superhighways	were	conceived	as	physical	means	or	national	infrastructures	joined	together	to	build	a	network	of	networks	called	
the global information infrastructure (Linares and Ortiz, 1995).
19 ACE,	June	15,	1994.	It	consisted	of	a	pilot	optical	fiber	network	of	more	than	10,000	kilometers	to	provide	computer-based	voice,	
data and image services, without neglecting access to new interactive on-demand television, online education and telecommuting 
services. Spanish ATM network coverage was initially limited to the metropolitan areas of Madrid and Barcelona (El País,	November	
25, 1994). ATM was the transport technique to ensure effective voice, video and data support on the same network, with noticeable 
cost	reductions	and	faster	speed;	it	used	small	data	packets	with	a	fixed	length	of	53	bytes	(Korhonen,	2003,	p.	235;	Lundmark	and	
Oster, 1998, pp. 3-9).
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Shortly after 1994, the ATM network in Spain covered the metropolitan areas of  Madrid and 
Barcelona and provided transit services from Portugal to the rest of  Europe, although its list 
of  subscribers was still rather sparse. In essence, it was limited to the subsidiary Telefónica 
R&D and the Higher Technical School of  Telecommunications Engineers at Madrid 
Polytechnic University20.
Around these dates, in the draft of  its telecommunications policy during the transitory phase to 
full competition, the Spanish government, in the hands of  the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), 
advocated improving business competitiveness, ensuring universal access to basic 
telecommunications services and promoting the development of  a national telecommunications 
sector. According to the final calendar for implementing GSM, during the second half  of  1994 
the technical regulations and rates were approved, and the date was set for the tender awarding 
the second license. In an effort to liberalize telecommunications, the government awarded three 
GSM licenses to three additional operators: Telefónica, Amena and Airtel. Two individual B2-type 
licenses were granted to Telecommunications par Satellites Mobiles, S.A.S. and Iridium 
Communications Germany, GmbH for the provision of  voice telephony services available to the 
public through the establishing or operation of  a public mobile telecommunications network that 
was either land- or satellite-based. Seven individual C2-type licenses were granted to seven 
operators: RONDA Grupo Consultor, S. L.; Hot Telecommunications, Ltd; Telespazio, S.p.a.; 
Eter Comunicaciones, S. L.; Tarifa Plana, S. L.; Globalcom Insa, S. A.; and Telefónica Servicios 
Audiovisuales, S. A.21 Telefónica was an indisputable contender for a license to provide services 
for the mere transformation of  its current authorization or license, based on its government 
contract. After half  a year of  proceedings and the deposit of  a 4-billion pesetas bank guarantee, 
in February 1995 it managed to transform its license and immediately afterward the GSM service 
concession contract was signed. Finally, Telefónica requested to transfer said administrative 
concession to its subsidiary Servicios Móviles, S. A. (Calvo, 2016, pp. 194-195). 
As the late Enrique Used indicated, Telefónica Móviles adopted a selective expansion policy 
with regard to mobile telephony in Spain. In other words, more than the economic or social 
elites, it targeted a potential clientele made up by groups of  workers who performed their jobs 
on the street. The second pillar of  the approach to expansion focused on reducing the costs 
for the mobile connection fees. This goal was not achieved, and this had detrimental effects on 
the service22. Instead of  responding to the social need, the deployment of  GSM ran into 
numerous administrative obstacles and resistance from users, who were wary of  the effects that 
this multiplication of  infrastructures would have on health and the environment (Navío, J., 
2004: Interview with Cayetano Lluch. Bit, 147, October-November 2004, 24-29)23. However, 
20 The European network based on ATM technology was inaugurated on October 24, with a video conference between Dublin and 
Brussels (LACA,	November	30,	1994).	By	joining	the	Ten-34	project	under	the	auspices	of	the	EU,	Telefónica	committed	to	
developing	broadband	telecommunications	and	the	interconnection	of	national	scientific	networks,	among	them	the	Spanish	Iris	
network (ACE, April 24, 1996).
21 Retevisión Móvil began offering its services on January 24, 1999 in ten cities under the commercial name Amena. With this, at 
the end of 1998, in Spain all telecommunications services were provided within a competitive system; the USA opted to use the 
1900 MHz band (Elias et al., 2016, pp. 141-142). The holders of individual C2-type licenses could establish or operate their own 
network using the public domain portion of the radio spectrum, excluding the provision of voice telephone services to the public 
by means of a land- or satellite-based network (Muñoz, 2000).
22	 Telefónica	opted	for	UMTS	without	any	guarantees	regarding	its	availability	in	a	specific	period	of	time,	but	with	the	certainty	that	
in a few years the mobile telephone would become a universal personal communicator and that renouncing UMTS would mean a 
collapse of the networks (Luis Lada in Zafra, 2000). Used indicated that in Italy, mobile telephones made of wood were sold that 
people used to simulate conversations, demonstrating the existence of an unmet need in society (BOLSA, March 2007, p. 53).
23	 3G	would	require	30%	more	stations	than	GSM.	As	Javier	Nadal	confessed	to	the	author	of	this	work,	Telefónica	employed	
specialists to explain in detail to subscribers the lack of danger posed by the mobile telephony antennas.
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the GSM system maintained its hegemony in Spanish mobile telephony until 2008, an aspect 
that will be addressed later (Graph 1).
3.  Implementation of the Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System (UMTS) 
The arrival of  the third generation of  mobile telephony (3G) was preceded by the development 
of  a bridge standard under the name of  2.5G and based on the GPRS (General Packet Radio 
Service) system, which improved the Internet connection, increased the transmission speed and 
made it possible to establish its cost based on the volume of  data transmitted, as opposed to 
the connection time24. The growth in the demand placed on the mobile telephony system 
required the expansion of  the band of  frequencies used in Europe, with the addition of  the 
1800 MHz band to provide for the new DCS (Digital Cellular System)25 mobile telephony 
service. 
In the beginning, the third generation of  mobile telephony, more than an immediate alternative 
to 2G, aspired to be a tool to optimize the existing operator networks and a complement to 
GSM, which offered new services (mainly multimedia) that had previously not existed 
(Papadimitriou, Pomportsis, Nicopolitidis and Obaidat, 2003, p. 121). 3G technology combined 
two innovations with long-ranging effects: wireless communications and the Internet. 
We will now examine this topic in greater detail. In 1985, an international consortium under the 
auspices of  the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) began work on the third 
generation systems under the acronym FSPTMT (Future Public Land Mobile Telephone System), 
a predecessor of  the IMT-2000, and with the simple pretension of  creating a pocket-sized mobile 
telephone capable of  being used anywhere around the world (ITU, 1995, p. 1; Rappaport, 
Muhamed, Buehrer and Doradla, 2000, p. 8; Agar, 2013; Springer and Weigel, 2013, p. 91)26. 
Faced with the new generation of  mobile telephony, the European Commission advocated 
harmonization and rationalization of  the radio spectrum and a policy for the entire 
European Union, in accordance with the desire to promote a single telecommunications 
market and in pursuit of  scale economies. Here lies one of  the big differences between 
European mobile telephony and that of  the United States, where the decision was left in the 
24 The 2.5G provided for new services, such as multimedia MMS messaging, a protocol for 3GPRS, with the capacity to send texts, 
images and audio (Telefónica R&D,	2003,	p.	24).	Most	importantly,	the	2.5G	defined	some	of	the	3G	services	and	applications,	and	
thus operators were reluctant to opt for 3G, whose main challenge laid in persuading 2G and 2.5G customers that the upgrade 
was worth it (OECD, 2004, p. 48).
25 DCS-1800 MHz was known as GSM-1800, based on GSM technology, but operating in the 1800-MHz band frequency with greater 
capacity (Anttalainen, 2003, p. 204).
26 FPLMTS were 3G systems conceived to unify the different systems that were then in existence in a radio infrastructure capable 
of	offering	a	wide	range	of	quality	services	(Callendar,	1994).	According	to	the	ITU,	public	mobile	telephony	systems	are	defined	
as land-based mobile systems for public correspondence based on radio stations connected to the public switched telephone 
network.	In	them,	a	series	of	general	operating	aspects	applied:	automatic	configuration	and	charging	of	calls	to	and	from	the	
mobile station; for international systems, the capacity to establish calls between mobile stations and any landline or mobile 
subscriber, in the latter case, within the system; charging of the costs in a way that is compatible with the pricing principles of 
the	public	switched	telephone	network	(PSTN);	not	requiring	any	significant	changes	in	the	landline	telephony	networks	with	the	
introduction	of	the	system;	maintaining	the	blocking	probability	within	similar	limits	to	those	of	the	PSTN	services	in	all	stages	of	
development and continuous quality control of the call, with automatic transfer between base stations as necessary. For a more 
precise	definition,	the	U.S.	landline	mobile	telephony	system	was	designed	to	permit	an	automatic	exchange	of	traffic	with	the	
public	switched	telephone	network	(PSTN)	and	offered	a	service	to	subscribers	that	was	similar	to	that	of	landline	calls:	high	
voice quality, high degree of reliability, low blocking and a relatively low cost (ITU, 1978-1995, p. 1).
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hands of  the market, causing the country to lag behind, technologically speaking (Columbus, 
2004, p. 2). However, it is sometimes forgotten that it was also protected against financial 
squandering.
The operating companies were after an explosion of  consumption in response to the size of  
the investments made, the good growth perspectives in these main markets and the big 
opportunities for increasing the declining income per subscriber27. But the El Dorado 
promised by UMTS would not come to fruition because the technology was not yet ready 
(users had the networks, but not the terminals), and the deployment of  other technologies 
was potentially much cheaper, such as the aforementioned GPRS (General Packet Radio 
Services), Enhanced Data for Global Evolution (EDGE) and WLAN (Wireless Local Area 
Network)28. 
UMTS was presented with enormous market potential, consisting of  65-71 licenses valued by 
the Schroder Salomon Smith Barney commercial bank at €158 billion. To the amount required 
to obtain the UMTS concessions, it was necessary to add as much as €175 billion over ten years 
for the construction of  networks, without forgetting the increasing amounts for investments in 
contents29. The total income generated by UMTS was estimated to be 300% higher than that of  
the existing GSM networks (Little, 2001, p. 11). 
Slightly before the end of  the 20th century, the European Commission arranged with 
telecommunications operators and manufacturers to speed up the introduction of  3G without 
setting any common standards30. Two opposing groups were formed. On the one hand were 
the Scandinavian countries and Spain, defenders of  quick development, who established a very 
low price (and even absolute gratuitousness) for licenses. On the other hand were those 
bedazzled by the brilliant results of  the license auction in the United Kingdom, in the midst of  
27  L’Expansion, September 14, 2000.
28 The Wall Street Journal,	June	18,	2000.	After	2001,	data	flowed	in	packets	following	the	adaptation	of	the	existing	network,	
which made it possible to connect to the Internet. Cingular Wireless,	the	first	operator	in	the	world	to	launch	EDGE	at	850	and	
1900	MHz,	chose	it	because	of	its	performance	or	capacity	and	spectral	efficiency	(traffic	capacity	and	service	quality)	that	
were competitive with any other technology option (Halonen, Romero and Melero, 2004, p. xxi and 173). While some analysts 
saw	WLAN	and	3G	(both	wireless	technologies	that	improve	different	degrees	of	mobility	and	that	allow	users	to	use	services)	as	
complementary,	other	interpret	WLAN	as	a	potential	threat	to	3G.	The	delay	in	marketing	3G	led	to	the	strengthening	of	the	2G	
and 2.5G services. The lack of commercial availability of the 3G networks obligated Bouygues Télécom, for example, to resort to 
EDGE technology for multimedia mobile services in late 2003 (OECD, 2004, pp. 48-49).
29 The Bank of France estimated the total cost of UMTS license acquisition in Europe to be $136 billion (more than 980 billion 
francs), not counting the costs related to network construction; it called for caution and advised about the risk of default by 
operators. Bouygues Télécom, one of the three GSM operators in France and contender for the license, resorted to a €6 billion 
loan (nearly 40 billion francs), more than half of which was dedicated to its UMTS strategy (Le Nouvel Observateur, December 21, 
2000). The spectrum reassignments for mobile services between 1994 and 2000 represented increases of 250% in investment and 
300%	in	job	positions	(Telecommunication	Industry	Association,	2011,	p.	1).	The	cost	of	UMTS	in	Europe	reached	€352.362	billion	
in 2002, more than half of the entire Spanish GDP forecasted for 2003. The initials UMTS have facetiously been said to stand for 
‘Unlimited Money To Spend’ (El País, September 29, 2002).
30	 In	all	reality,	there	was	a	“financial,	regulatory	and	political	holy	war	for	control	of	the	wireless	future”	that	shattered	the	
project	by	the	International	Telecommunication	Union,	the	responsibility	for	which	was	attributed	in	part	to	the	intransigence	
of Ericsson and Qualcom, who were staunch defenders of their respective WCDMA and CDMA systems. In pursuit of their goal to 
lead CDMA and the wireless Internet markets through strategic investments in newly founded companies, Qualcomm pressured 
the government and launched strong investments ($500 million) in its venture capital division Qualcomm Ventures (New York 
Times, February 15, 1999	and	November	15,	2000;	Cnet,	January	2,	2002).	Different	entities	in	the	North	American	administration	
lashed out against establishing a single standard in Europe, in open contradiction to the WTO obligations and the ITU guidelines, 
considering	it	prejudicial	for	the	U.S.	industry.	The	European	Commission	assured	its	transatlantic	ally	that	Europe	would	respect	
the competition and would be open to alternative systems (Mock, 2005, p. 206; Press Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman, 
December 22, 1998; European Commission, Press Release, Brussels, January 18, 1999; EE Times, 1/21/1999).
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the financial telecommunications bubble31. The 3G spectrum auctions held back then in 
Europe collected between 150 and 600 dollars per capita (Fuentelsaz, Maícas and Polo, 2008, 
pp. 436-449; The Council of  Economic Advisers, 2000, p. 1).
The first four UMTS mobile telephony licenses were granted free of  charge in Finland in 1999 
to three operators and the Finnish consortium Suomen Kolmegee. The country 
bureaucratically established the number and size of  the licenses in terms of  the available radio 
spectrum, commonly known to be a scarce resource, and the companies. Germany, Greece and 
Austria used the tender to determine the number and size of  the licenses, as well as the license 
holders. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands chose an intermediate procedure, according 
to which the number and size of  the licenses was determined using bureaucratic methods, but 
the licenses were assigned to the companies through an auction (Appendix 1) (Cartelier, 2003, 
pp. 63-85; Khosrowpour, 2004, p. 132; Börgers and Dustman, 2002, p. 1; Börgers and 
Dustmann, 2003, pp. 215-268)32. 
Without detracting in the least from the chosen method, it would behoove us to keep in mind the 
procedure that was followed to implement each of  the options. As an example, in Austria the 
regulatory agency carried out a public consultation on matters related to the introduction and 
awarding of  UMTS licenses. In a second case, the interested parties took part in the configuration 
of  the 3G license auction in Switzerland, using a dual track approach. They could express their 
opinions on different matters related to the concession through a public consultation and a 
discussion of  the drafts of  the bidding documents, the results of  which were taken into account 
for the final version of  the tender documents (TRT, June 15, 1999; OFCOM, 2000)33. 
In terms of  the concessions, in the United Kingdom, the first auction for UMTS licenses 
amounted to 22.5 billion pounds (€37 billion), which greatly exceeded the predictions (National 
Audit Office, 2001, p. 1). The Radiocommunications Agency proposed one of  the two auction 
designs based on the Anglo-Dutch concept of  Klemperer. They are hybrids consisting of  a first 
part with ascending offers (“English”) and a second part with sealed top-down offers (“Dutch”)34. 
31 Registered and approved as bidders in the tender were ten consortia, including those already installed, i.e. Com Mobile 
(subsidiary of Swisscom), Orange (France Télécom 85%) and diAx (via dSpeed); other applicants were Cablecom Management 
(NTL),	Sunrise	Communications,	Hutchison	3G	Europe	Investments,	Team	3G	(One.Tel	of	Australia,	Sonera	3G	and	Telefónica),	
Telenor	Mobile,	T-Mobile	and	Teldotcom.	The	latter	later	abandoned	the	project,	as	did	Cablecom	Management,	T-Mobile,	Telenor	
Mobile, Hutchison 3G Europe Investments and the two partners of Telefónica in the Team 3G consortium (Curwen, 2002, p. 85). 
32 According to the last two references, the tender strategies approved by the companies were much more complex than the 
economic	theory	predictions.	The	early	options	favored	profits,	while	the	later	ones	showed	preference	to	efficiency	(Janssen,	
2004,	p.	25).	The	theoretical	contributions	unaffected	by	the	weight	of	the	industry	specificities	regarding	the	UMTS	license	
results (Klemperer, 2001; Klemperer, 1999, pp. 227-286) have been strongly questioned by other theorists, among them Kruse 
(2004, pp. 185-212), who advocated also considering factors such as the time and country. Some authors doubt about the 
rationality of the investments in UMTS, which could respond more to emotional reasons than sensible ones (Lurin, 2010, p. 
296); an improved scheme for granting licenses that demonstrates the advantages of the traditional mechanisms due to their 
transparency	for	all	candidates,	their	adoption	of	both	comparative	and	financial	criteria	and	their	extreme	flexibility	so	that	
the	regulatory	authorities	can	reach	their	objectives,	be	it	increased	revenue	for	the	government	or	faster	network	deployment,	
the introduction of high competitiveness incentives or the reduction of the possibility of collusion and credit risk assumed by the 
governments (Louta, Roussaki and Anagnostou, 2003, pp. 113-120).
33 The 1999 public consultation in Switzerland showed that there was a sharp interest in the new licenses. Far from the countries of 
the	economic	center,	Turkey	created	a	National	UMTS	Coordination	Board,	on	which	were	representatives	of	operators,	companies	
and public organizations to participate in the granting of UMTS licenses (OCDE, 2002a, p. 150).
34	 In	the	first	part,	the	price	of	a	license	increases	until	five	bidders	are	left;	in	the	second	phase,	these	five	remaining	bidders	only	
present	a	final	offer,	with	a	minimum	equivalent	to	the	last	valid	price	from	the	first	phase.	The	licenses	are	then	granted	to	
the four highest bidders. The difference in the two formats lies in the price that the successful bidders pay. In the Anglo-Dutch 
discriminatory type of auction, the four winners pay for their respective offers (Abbink, 2001, p. 1). The Dutch top-down auction 
was rooted in the system used to sell tulips.
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In the United Kingdom, the five licenses went to existing operators (Vodafone, Airtouch, BT 
Cellnet, New Orange and One2One) and to the Canadian operator TIW, supported by the Hong 
Kong Hutchison Whampoa group (Gruber, 2005, p. 260; L’Expansion, 636-642, February 1, 2001, 
p. 13; L’Économiste, May 6, 2000; RedesTelecom, October 22, 2007)35. 
Especially significant was the 3G auction in Germany, a country in which the increased demand 
for mobile telephony and Internet and the sharp decrease in prices in all telecommunications 
services promoted the real and potential growth of  telecommunications. By mid-2000, the 
number of  mobile telephony users reached the 34 million mark, and expected to climb to 48 
million by year end36. The 3G license auction in Germany produced $46 billion, five times 
more than was expected by the government, while the per capita cost of  the licenses remained 
€35 lower than the corresponding figures in the UK37. 
The European Commission had in its possession reports stressing the risks of  implementing 
UMTS and their consequences for businesses. According to their conclusions, the first cause of  
the disaster lays in the unbridled expectations placed on the evolution of  the market when the 
concessions began to be awarded, which pushed the prices higher. The second cause was found 
in the haste with which the operating companies acted, insisting on undertaking the sale of  
licenses without waiting for the arrival of  suitable technology (McKinsey, 2002)38. 
Different analysts indicated that the crisis caused by UMTS would result in an unprecedented 
concentration of  telecommunications on the European scene; only one peloton of  five groups, 
led by the four ‘giants’ (Vodafone, France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom and BT), and in which 
Telefónica could enter, were among the winners39. Indeed, the high bids shook up the industrial 
structure in Europe, fueling the large companies with growing importance in Europe. 
The colossal size of  the market we are referring to obligated operators to engage in co-
opetition, i.e., to form strategic alliances to obtain significant shares. The concession process 
produced noticeable variation in the scale and geographic distribution. Thirteen operators held 
nearly three-fourths of  the second- and third-generation licenses proposed up to 2002 in all of  
35 In an attempt to rationalize the behavior of the observed offer, highlight is put on the resistance of the data to provide 
specific	evidence	of	certain	rationalizations	and	the	plausibility	that	without	being	confirmed	or	rejected	directly	by	the	data,	
rationalizes	some	of	the	offers	made.	The	first	five	bidders	to	withdraw	from	the	auction	in	the	United	Kingdom	did	so	in	quick	
succession; the withdrawals began in round 94 and ended in round 101, which closed phase 1 of the auction. The winners of the 
licenses and their offers were: A, TIW for £4.3847 billion; B, Vodafone for £5.964 billion; C, BT3G for £4.0301 billion; D, One2One 
for £4.0036 billion; and E, Orange for £4.095 billion (Börgers and Dustman, 2002, pp. 6-7).
36 With the deregulation of the telecommunications market in early 1998, the price of long-distance domestic calls fell by 89% and 
Internet	use	by	35%;	Internet	traffic	doubled	in	1999,	a	year	in	which	the	number	of	private	customers	increased	by	70%	(The Wall 
Street Journal, July 25, 2000).
37	 The	figures	vary	according	to	the	source;	in	one,	the	Spanish	figure	was	€15/h.,	with	€648	in	the	UK,	€171	in	Holland,	€613	in	
Germany, €240 in Italy, €82 in Austria and €337 in France (Van Damme, 2000, pp. 4-8). The high price of the German and British 
auctions	was	due	to	the	fact	that	they	took	place	early	in	the	European	auction	cycle,	when	the	major	players	believed	that	they	
needed to win in both key countries or lose the opportunity to develop a pan-European network. The debt loads of the successful 
bidders shot up at the same rate as the auctions (Cowhey, Aronson and Richards, 2008, p. 20). Debitel, associated with Swisscom, 
withdrew from the auction as a bidder, seduced by a favorable offer from Mobilcom (France Télécom) (Heuvelhof, De Jong, Kars 
and Stout, 2009, p. 127).
38	 One	of	the	worst	scenarios	possible	came	to	pass:	the	income	and	profits	from	the	new	network	were	lower	than	expected	and	
the company was confronted with problems with the debts they assumed to pay for the licensing rights (Ermoliev and Marti, 2012, 
p. 150).
39 L’Expansion, 636-642, February 1, 2001, p. 13; the Forrester Research agency predicted a drop of 15% in income per user in 2005 
and	the	disappearance	of	profits	by	2007,	which	would	take	six	years	to	recuperate	(InfoWorld, January 22, 2001, p. 52); Arthur 
D.	Little	(Little,	2001,	p.	37)	indicated	that	the	financial	pressures	from	the	UMTS	license	rights	and	the	network	deployment	
costs, also indicated by Halonen et al. (2004, p. 468), were cause to predict greater consolidation in Western Europe.
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Europe (Whalley and Curwen, 2003, pp. 45-57)40. The intense growth of  mobile telephony 
resulted in their being more than 600 million subscribers at the start of  2001. 
4. Spain: between the domestic market and globalization
Spain spoke up once the European guidelines were already established. The Order of  
November 10, 1999 approved the schedule of  administrative clauses and technical 
specifications for the tender of  four licenses that governed the establishing of  the 
telecommunications network and the provision of  third generation service41. The government, 
then in the hands of  the right, intended to attain two fundamental objectives of  a more global, 
but less specific nature than the previous ones: quick access to the information society and 
overcoming the comparative backwardness of  the country in developing it42. 
The government justified the selection of  the tender method as a system for awarding the 3G 
mobile telephony licenses for several reasons43. First of  all, it understood it as the traditional 
system systematically used in the Spanish legal system to accredit those entitled to provide 
public and telecommunications services. The other reason owes to the priority objective of  
situating Spain at the top in terms of  developing this technology in Europe in its facets of  
greater and better implementation as a means to foster the information society. Furthermore, 
the government wanted to ensure a volume, pace and quality of  the investment made in 
telecommunications infrastructures, affordable prices for all citizens and fast development of  
UMTS services. Fourthly, the government wanted to better meet the communication needs of  
citizens through greater concurrence in a sector characterized by the vitality of  demand and 
high rates of  current and future growth, without neglecting the provision of  many other 
additional services that had so far been inviable, primarily access to broadband Internet. The 
promotion of  investment and the creation of  new jobs that achieving this purpose would bring 
along with it would inevitably have the effect of  invigorating the Spanish economy44. 
The acting PP government, while the Congress was shut down, awarded licenses to three 
existing operators (Telefónica, Airtel and Retevisión-Amena) and one to the Xfera consortium. 
That was far from the examples of  Austria and Switzerland described above, characterized by 
transparency45. In spite of  the controversy generated, the Administration refused to nullify the 
40 Telefónica’s international strategy differs from that of BT and Deutsche Telekom in terms of their entry level (Cairo, 2014, p. 154).
41 BOE,	270,	November	11,	1999,	pp.	39.340-39.348.	Jazztel	characterized	the	bidding	documents	as	a	“mess,”	drafted	“in	a	hurry	
and	on	the	fly”	(Mercadofinanciero, February 16, 2000).
42 Diario de sesiones del Congreso de los diputados (DdSCD), Plenary session and Permanent delegation, 25, 9/20/2000, p. 1.101.
43	 It	is	difficult	to	understand	the	Spanish	government	being	included	alongside	the	British	and	Italian	governments	as	those	capable	
of attracting great value through the concession of 3G licenses without any or very limited participation in their holders (Louta et 
al., 2003, pp. 113-120).
44	 The	minister	of	the	area	in	question	summarized	the	government’s	objectives	as	greater	freedom,	greater	competition,	better	services	
and lower prices; in short, more and better employment (DdSCD, Plenary session and Permanent delegation, 25, 9/20/2000, p. 1.125).
45 From highest to lowest score, the successful bidders were Telefónica Servicios Móviles, S. A., Airtel Móvil, S. A., Retevisión Móvil, 
S. A. and Xfera Móviles, S. A. (BOE, 62, March 13, 2000, p. 10.327). The Xfera consortium was made up by Vivendi-FCC as the 
majority	shareholder	(27.5%),	ACS	(20%),	Mercapital	(17.6%),	Sonera	(15%),	Acesa	(7.9%),	Orange	(7%,	belonging	to	Mannesman)	
and Ahorro Corporación (5%). The remaining consortia were Movi2 (Uni2, France Télécom and Iberdrola) and Movilwed 21 (Jazztel 
and Deutsche Telecom) (ComputerWorld, March 17, 2000). Movi 2 was a union formed by three companies from the sector 
(Lince	Telecomunicaciones,	S.	A.,	Multitel	Cable,	S.	A.	and	Suala	Telecom,	S.	A.),	three	banking	institutions	(Caja	de	Ahorros	
and	Monte	de	Piedad	de	Madrid	and	Cajas	de	Ahorros	de	Galicia	y	de	Valencia,	Castellón	y	Alicante)	and	a	power	company	
(Iberdrola	Diversificación,	S.	A.).	A	public	tender	convened	to	grant	four	individual	B2-type	licenses	to	establish	the	required	
telecommunications	network	and	for	the	provision	of	the	third-generation	mobile	communications	service,	file	001-022561,	
Certification	of	the	General	Registry	of	the	General	Secretariat	for	Communications,	which	listed	the	candidates	submitting	
tenders,	January	12,	2000.	Móvil	Wed	21,	S.	A.	alleged	cross-holdings	in	the	capital	of	several	bidders	by	Caja	Madrid	(Public	
tender	.,	file	001-022561,	Document	from	the	tenderer	Móvil	Wed	21,	February	7,	2000).
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tender with the argument that it would mean violating the rules of  law, create legal insecurity 
and reduce the international credibility of  Spain. Uni2, a losing consortium formed with 
Jazztel, called for the precautionary suspension of  the tender, as did Ferrovial. The courts 
rejected both claims46.
The leftist parliament accused the Government of  three key errors in the awarding of  3G 
mobile telephony: haste, a total lack of  transparency and underselling of  public resources with 
no guarantee of  low prices for the service47. Recapitulating, they meant to say subordination of  
democracy to efficacy, of  transparent and democratic procedures to an obscurantist decision; 
turning efficacy into a great political error in perspective, because in the end, their proposal was 
not the most effective and meant heavy losses for the public treasury. To use a cycling 
metaphor: “You who intended to be the leaders of  the peloton of  the new economy are now 
taking the risk of  isolating yourselves from the peloton and having to be picked up by the 
sweeper car.” The socialist inquiry assessed the losses for the country in the billions. The 
government forgot (and for the Minister of  Science and Technology, an economist, this was a 
lot to forget) that the indirect effects of  the knowledge, important in high-tech industries, tend 
towards geographical localization and that Finland, the other early participant in the concession 
of  licenses mentioned earlier, was much more advanced in the development of  a mobile 
application industry (The Council of  Economic Advisers, 2000, p. 2; DdSCD, Plenary session 
and Permanent delegation, 23, 9/13/2000, pp. 996-997 and 7, 5/17/2000, pp. 221-226)48. 
In Spain, 3G did not take off  until 2003, in a race with obstacles that would delay the 
overtaking of  GSM until 2008 (Graph 1)49. Telefónica charged Ericsson, Nokia and Motorola 
with the first phase of  construction of  its UMTS network in sixteen large Spanish cities, with 
an estimated cost of  20 billion pesetas. It thus repeated its previous experience with 
technologies in the development of  GSM50. The first experimental UMTS test was not far 
46 Uni2, owned by France Télécom, initially challenged only the concession awarded to Xfera; Ferrovial protested all four awards 
(Cinco días, March 10, 2001). The Minister of Science and Technology held the position of General Manager and Board Member of 
Retevisión in October 1997.
47 The socialists denounced irregularities in the concession and the violation of the terms and conditions as the result of the lack of 
information on the conditions and contracts that governed the tenders, and also for accepting aspiring operators who presented 
tenders for two licenses or in two consortia. They did not refrain from elaborating on several incidents. It would seem that the 
consulting	firm	contracted	by	the	ministry	had	worked	for	one	of	the	aspiring	consortia	in	the	tender	and	held	a	meeting	with	the	
table to establish the assessment criteria, according to the tender regulations; in addition, a senior civil servant charged with 
preparing the bidding documents was hired by one of the consortia members in the middle of the tender process. The Izquierda 
Unida	Group	qualified	the	tender	process	as	a	“bargain	for	companies	and	bad	business	for	the	citizens;”	a	representative	of	the	
Mixed	Parliamentary	Group	for	the	BNG	considered	it	a	fiasco (DdSCD, Plenary session and Permanent delegation, 25, 9/20/2000, 
pp. 1.129 and 1.136; 10/26/2000, p. 2.364 and 2.369). Refuting that the low tender prices would translate into the service prices, 
the socialist representative placed great emphasis on rebutting the minister, an economist, with economic arguments on the service 
prices, indicating that they do not depend on the submerged costs, rather on competition (DdSCD, Plenary session and Permanent 
delegation,	25,	9/20/2000,	p.	2.368	and	2.369).	As	voiced	by	the	financial	media,	all	the	consortia	in	the	UMTS	tender	had	cross-
shareholdings,	in	other	words,	there	was	the	direct	or	indirect	presence	of	companies	such	as	BBVA,	Caja	Madrid,	Mannesmann	and	
Kutxa in several operators who submitted bids to the tender process (Mercadofinanciero, February 16 and 21, 2000).
48	 The	socialist	opposition	qualified	the	awarding	of	the	UMTS	licenses	as	the	“biggest	gift	of	public	money	in	our	economic	history”	
(DdSCD, Plenary session and Permanent delegation, 25, 9/20/2000, p. 1.127). Spain recorded the least impact on the budgetary 
balance of all the countries in the EU granting UMTS licenses in 2000: only one-tenth of a point more than the GDP (Sánchez, 
2003, p. 22).
49 According to the testimony of one of the protagonists, in 2004, investors, analysts and experts in marketing agreed in forecasting 
a	brilliant	future	ahead	for	UMTS	(Navío,	J.,	2004.	Interview	with	Cayetano	Lluch,	Bit,	147,	October-November	2004,	pp.	24-29).
50 The chosen cities were Madrid, Barcelona, Zaragoza, Málaga, Bilbao, Las Palmas, Murcia, Valladolid, Córdoba, Palma de Mallorca, 
Vigo,	Alicante,	Gijón	and	La	Coruña	(El País,	November	29,	2000).	The	three	manufacturers	were	required	to	supply	the	radio	
access network and the combined switching structure (packets and circuits), as well as 3G terminals and laboratory systems to 
conduct interoperability tests among the three providers (RedesTelecom,	November	29,	2000).
15
Harvard Deusto Business Research. Volume VIII. Issue 1. Pages 3-30. ISSN: 2254-6235
Harvard Deusto Business Research
 
Technological change, opening and internationalization of Spanish telecommunications. The transition... 
In 1999, Spain 
approved the 
schedule of  
administrative 
clauses and 
technical 
specifications 
for the tender 
awarding four 
licenses to 
operate third-
generation 
mobile 
telephone 
services.
behind, and the R&D subsidiary developed user location services, an experimental platform 
within the UMTS framework to offer 3G services and experiences with local WLAN and 
Bluetooth wireless technologies and their integration with GPRS mobile technologies. In 2002, 
the effective deployment of  the data services over GPRS took place and the testing phase was 
concluded for the UMTS network within the time periods promised to the government; in 
October 2003, Telefónica Móviles made the ‘Oficin@ MoviStar UMTS’ available to customers, 
the first pre-commercial third-generation service in Spain, including the ‘Pack Degustación 
UMTS’ (UMTS Sample Pack) card and the new telephone terminal, the LG U8150. Coinciding 
in part with these actions, Quam began to prepare the conditions for the development of  its 
UMTS strategy (OECD, 2004, p. 34; Telefónica, S. A., 2001, pp. 40, 77 and 73; Telefónica, 
2002, pp. 27 and 73; 2003, p. 43; Movilonia, October 20, 2003)51. 
Accordingly, first Telefónica Móviles and then Vodafone, heir to Airtel in Spain, took the lead 
in 3G with an experimental version and using PCMCIA cards targeting major clients and not 
apt for mobile phones, rather laptop computers, which would later arrive in the market52. Both 
torchbearing operators took on different levels of  obligations in Spain: Telefónica Móviles 
committed to €1 billion in infrastructure investments over three years and prior to November 
2003, it installed 750 base stations that provided coverage to 40 Spanish cities with combined 
Graph 1
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Source:	Own	creation,	based	on	data	from	the	National	Commission	of	Markets	and	Competition,	2016.
51	 The	UMTS	Sample	Pack,	available	for	a	price	of	€299,	was	the	first	prepaid	3G	data	card	in	Spain	(PCWorld, December 1, 2004); 
imitating	two	Asian	countries	(Japan	and	Taiwan)	and	four	European	countries	(Germany,	the	Netherlands,	Belgium	and	France),	
Telefónica	introduced	the	i-mode	in	mid-2003,	a	mobile	Internet	service	provided	by	the	Japanese	company	NTT	DoCoMo	(OECD,	
2004, p. 49; NTT DoCoMo, June 25, 2003). During the UMTS launch phase in Germany, Telefónica also chose Ericsson as a provider.
52 Telefónica Móviles planned to distribute 2,500 PCMCIA (Computer Memory Card International Association) UMTS cards among 500 
of the operator’s large clients; Vodafone used the SIMO TCI computer trade fair as a platform for its pre-commercial launch of its 
PCMCIA dual UMTS/GPRS URA (Vodafone Remote Access) card, also aimed at corporate environments, before making it available to 
residential users (ComputerWorld,	November	7,	2003).
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technology (Nokia packet switching and radio and circuit switching deployed from Ericsson). 
In a larger amount, the investment announced by Vodafone was reported to be €2.8 billion and 
1,000 stations that provided coverage to twenty cities with Nortel Networks technology53. 
We must, however, recognize that UMTS drove the operators into debt and limited their 
investment capacity54. Different barriers arose against the expansion of  UMTS. In spite of  the 
relatively low numbers of  subscribers, the mobile telephony operators granted the UMTS licenses 
in Spain committed to investments of  €16.296 billion and €7 billion in guarantees. Correcting the 
gift they were accused of  having given, the government established an annual rate or fee of  €100 
billion over twenty years as compensation for the low amounts collected in exchange for the 
licenses granted55. It is true that it was willing to relax its initial requirements, but without this 
altering the agreed investment plan in any way (Senate-commission, October 1, 2002, 329, p. 5)56.
The UMTS licensees, in turn, operated for a while in an environment of  uncertainty, in fear 
that the government’s (Ministry of  the Economy) zeal to collect funds would lead it to grant 
new licenses, in spite of  the presumed limitation on the available radio spectrum wielded by the 
Ministry of  Science and Technology, thus restricting business expectations57. The licensees 
appeared skeptical regarding the deadlines set by the Government for the commercial launch 
of  the UMTS services in Spain58. 
Following the comings and goings (the so-called ‘political and legislative yo-yo’ of  UMTS in 
Spain), the Ministry of  Science and Technology eased the investment and employment 
obligations for ten of  the obligations that the mobile operators were bound to when obtaining 
their licenses. The new conditions allowed them to save around €6 billion, 30% of  the amount 
initially committed to for the deployment of  networks and infrastructures. Added to this was 
nearly €4 billion earmarked for the development of  applications and services for the new 
mobile. The ministry also lowered the universal coverage obligations, including the last 15% of  
those who lived in rural or remote areas. In the very sensitive area of  employment, the license 
holders were exempted from the requirement to create 36,300 direct job positions and more or 
less the triple that number in indirect jobs. The pact between the ministry and operators did 
away with the obligation to set up R&D centers, capital venture funds for technology 
companies and other social projects that represented investments of  more than €2 billion. 
Finally, they eliminated any reference to the prices of  the new services59. Altogether, the new 
53 El País,	October	30,	2003.	During	the	first	quarter	of	2001,	Airtel	deployed	UMTS	radio	base	stations	in	four	large	cities	(Madrid,	
Barcelona, Valencia and Seville) with Lucent Technologies technology and had plans to extend 3G commercial services over 
the summer of that same year to 23 cities in which a fourth of the population of Spain was concentrated (Wireless Internet 
Telecommunications Newsletter, March 2001, p. 3; European telecom, July 31, 2000, p. 13).
54 Computing, June 20, 2001.
55 El País,	November	8,	2000.	For	Telefónica,	the	rate	reduced	by	an	annual	amount	of	25	billion	its	cash flow, i.e., financial	
resources (Luis Lada in Zafra, 2000).
56 The government spoke of ‘more acceptable conditions for the companies’ and offered to drastically lower the guarantees; on 
their behalf, it associated the possibility of sharing networks to the commitment to offer UMTS services as soon as possible (Cinco 
Días,	December	17	and	November	20,	2002).
57 El País,	November	3,	2000;	the	media	talked	about	a	true	chasm	in	the	government	between	the	proposals	made	by	the	Ministry	
of Science and Technology, which was in favor of limiting the licenses, and the departments belonging to the economic area, 
which were in favor of expanding them.
58	 Telefónica	Móviles	indicated	that	the	August	1,	2001	deadline	was	five	months	earlier	than	that	recommended	by	the	European	
Union	and	its	fulfillment	was	subject	to	the	absence	of	any	technical	barriers,	which	were	emerging	in	terms	of	the	availability	
of the terminals and the lack of services they promised (fast Internet connection, videoconferencing and e-mail) (La Vanguardia, 
August 29, 2000).
59	 The	bulk	of	the	investment	will	be	concentrated	in	the	first	five	years:	€2.3	billion	in	the	first	two	fiscal	years	and	4.5	billion	over	
the next three.
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conditions decimated the commitments associated with the concessions and thus compromised 
the objectives of  universal mobile telephone coverage and the development of  the information 
society that were so repeatedly proclaimed. 
5.  The role of Spain in the European implementation of third-
generation mobile telephony
The third generation of  mobile telephony had some supranational dimensions built into the 
UMTS standard. At this point, we will turn to globalization. As a historic telecommunications 
company, Telefónica focused its strategy along two priority lines, consisting of  maintaining their 
leadership in the landline telecommunications market to ensure revenue generation and to 
guarantee its future as Spain’s chosen communications provider (Linares, 2001). Stipulated by 
another strategist of  the operator, it was a plan based on six central ideas that referred to 
geographic positioning, company structure, offer and financial performance. Specifically, it implied 
maintaining leadership in Spain, growing organically and territorially in Latin America, expanding 
in Europe by taking advantage of  the concession of  new licenses, functioning as a unified 
company, generating scale economies to reduce costs, developing the mobile Internet market with 
content applications and strengthening their financial situation (Luis Lada, in Zafra, 2000). 
During the 1990s, the expansion by Telefónica throughout Europe was very limited, as it lacked 
any implementation in the area, except for small shares in Portugal and Austria. In the opinion 
of  Plaza (2000), this was a great gap in Telefónica’s strategy, which made it very vulnerable 
within the EU. The situation changed after 2000, with the acquisition of  UMTS mobile 
telephony licenses in several European countries (Calvo, 2016, p. 41)60. In Central Europe, 
Telefónica controlled an Austrian company providing telecommunications services to 
businesses, and through Terra Mobile (51% owned by Telefónica Móviles and 49% by Terra 
Networks), the Finnish company Iobox, the leading independent portal and content aggregator 
in Europe61. Towards the end of  2006, the tangible and intangible investments of  the 
Telefónica Group totaled €5.067 billion, divided between Telefónica de España (906 and 143), 
Telefónica Latinoamérica (652 and 85), Telefónica Móviles (1,072 and 229), Grupo O2 (1,255 
and 277), Grupo Cˇeský (108 and 34), Telefónica Contenidos (36 and 1), Atento (17 and 2) and 
Resto y eliminaciones (Remainder and eliminations) (239 and 11)62. 
It has been said that Telefónica’s access to Europe was quick and decisive, and the figures back 
this to a certain degree, since in only two years (between 2004 and 2006), the continent went 
from contributing slightly more than 4% of  the company’s income to 26%. A closer 
examination indicates some slow starts, because Telefónica had already been operating for years 
60 Some brief references to these episodes seem to reduce the initiatives in Europe to a mere parenthesis, which demonstrates the 
need to reconstruct this interdisciplinary story we referred to at the start. For Fernández and Mielgo (2008, p. 85), for example, 
the	UMTS	licenses	won	in	Germany,	Italy,	Austria	and	Switzerland	were	projects	that	we	ultimately	scrapped	due	to	the	failure	
and	non-fulfillment	of	expectations	that	said	technology	had	generated.	
61	 Iobox	originally	pursued	the	provision	of	strongly	localized	services	for	each	country.	Iobox	was	financed	in	two	successive	rounds	
in	the	amount	of	€3.1	and	13	million	(January	and	December	1999),	in	the	first	round	by	SFK	Finance,	Eqvitec	Partners,	Alto	
Berkeley Investments and Capman Capital Management, and in the second round by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital Partners. 
In late 2000, Terra Mobile had a total of 3,052,802 registered subscribers and operated in the markets of Finland, Switzerland, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain (Telefónica, S. A., Informe Anual, 2000, p. 32; Shi, 2004, p. 120; Koskinen and Rouhola, 
2000, pp. 1-2). Iobox represented the addition of €233.45 million in the consolidation after late 2000, out of a total of €5.21363 
billion (Telefónica, S. A., Informe Anual, 2000, p. 102).
62 Telefónica, S. A., Documento de Registro de Obligaciones y Derivados, Appendix	IV	of	Regulation	(EC)	No.	809/2004	from	the	
Commission on April 29, 2004, p. 24.
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in different segments of  the European market. What occurred was an important step forward, 
but not one free of  prior failures. 
Faced with a loss of  market share to the competition in its traditionally privileged space, 
Telefónica saw UMTS third-generation mobile telephony as the ‘window to Europe. ’ Knowing 
that this market would position it among the top world operators, it decided to take its chances 
abroad in the new market segment. 
As indicated above, one of  the company’s strategic objectives at the start of  the millennium 
was to obtain licenses to operate mobile services in Europe, using UMTS technology. The 
UMTS-based strategy, conveyed by Telefónica Intercontinental as the instrumental company, 
was pan-European in nature, giving priority to the markets in large countries (United 
Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy) and one of  the most advanced, namely Switzerland. 
Telefónica linked its technical success in 3G telephony not only to obtaining the licenses and 
its operation in 2002, but also to strategic actions during this year and the following one. Such 
actions included, first of  all, the creation of  a pan-European operator with two parallel 
structures – one on a European scale, with strategic partners, in which Telefónica would have 
a majority shareholding, and another on a local scale in each country. To this, the provision of  
wireless-Internet services was added by establishing new companies with partners in UMTS or 
by acquiring existing companies. Thirdly, the strategy involved the acquisition of  alternative 
mobile operators in the main European countries prior to the launch of  UMTS, as a customer 
base. The strategic actions continued with the creation of  a single mobile brand associated 
with UMTS63. 
As materialization of  the strategy, in 2000, which was especially intensive in terms of  activity, 
Telefónica conceived a consortium with BBVA, La Caixa, Banco Zaragozano and Abengoa to 
obtain third-generation mobile telephony licenses in the main European countries, among 
them the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and France64. To finance these operations, 
Telefónica took out a syndicated loan from two Spanish banks and five foreign banks in the 
limited amount of  €8 billion (1.33 trillion pesetas)65. That same year, BBVA and Telefónica 
63 Telefónica, Informe Anual, 1999, p. 32. One of the directors points to the precocity in declaring itself a global player in a market 
with a restricted club of global players. “It is clear that in order to be a global player, it is necessary to have a strong presence 
in Europe: Interview with Alfredo Acebal, CEO of Quam, February and September 2002, in Picot and Doeblin (2013), p. 97. The 
analysts	at	McKinsey,	the	banking	institution	involved	and	famous	law	firm	in	London,	reported	that	the	average	revenue	per	
user (ARPU) could be between €60 and €80 (Conversation with Fernando Panizo, February 1, 2017). The oral history focuses the 
decisive stakes set by Europe on the link between privatizations and free competition, which opened the way for the mobile 
business (Conversation with Luis López-van Dam about Telefónica’s globalization process, 4/18 and 5/13/2013). Far from 
unanimity, a sector of Telefónica positioned itself against the purchase of UMTS licenses in Europe. 
64	 CNMV,	Significant	event,	6.603,	3/31/2000;	Network World, April 3, 2000. The BBVA had a 9.1% holding in Telefónica’s capital, 
greater	than	that	owned	by	Caja	de	Ahorros	y	Pensiones	de	Barcelona	(5.01%)	(Spanish	National	Stock	Exchange	Commission,	
7/15/2000).
65	 CNMV,	Significant	event,	8.754,	8/22/2000.	Banco	Santander	Central	Hispano	(BSCH)	and	Banco	Bilbao	Vizcaya	Argentaria	(BBVA);	
ABN	AMRO	Bank	N.V.,	Chase	Manhattan	Bank,	Citybank/Schroder,	Dresdner	Kleinwort	Benson	and	Salomon	Smith	Barney.	The	loan	
was divided into two portions of €6 billion (998.316 billion pesetas), with a term of 364 days, extensible for an additional year 
and a second portion of 2 billion (332.772 billion pesetas) with a stipulated term of three years. Telefónica lost 4.7% on the stock 
market, closing at less than €22 (ComputerWorld, August 23, 2000). The oral history of Telefónica perfectly records the colossal 
amounts of money sunk into the operators, which have led to problems that have yet to be solved, as occurred with Yoigo-
Sonera (Conversation with Fernando Panizo, 2/1/2017). Xfera (Spain), Quam (Germany) and Ipse (Italy) threw in the towel even 
before beginning to provide services (El País, September 29, 2002). Xfera sold its UMTS license to Abengoa in an effort towards 
diversification	in	the	information	and	telecommunications	sector;	this	company,	in	turn,	through	its	subsidiary	Telvent	Sistemas	y	
Redes purchased for €25 million 3.71% of the capital of Xfera, a percentage that it increased to 5.4% with the purchase of shares 
in Xfera that were in the hands of Vivendi (Cinco Días,	December	30,	2002;	CNMV,	Significant	event,	42.988,	6/30/2003).
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forged a broad alliance that included UMTS business, along with another thirteen joint actions, 
among which the Telefónica Group’s holding in the bank Unoe.Bank, S. A. stands out.66 
However, the agreement, a lifeline for a very worn Villalonga, ‘lacked concrete resolution’ and 
BBVA ended up with a questionable participation in the consortia for the UMTS licenses67.
In a similar manner, the competition began to take shape with the transversal alliance between 
the electric companies and telecommunications companies (Endesa with 38.9% of  the capital, 
Unión Fenosa with 23.6% and Telecom Italia with 37.5%. Under the name of  Auna, the new 
rival consortium would cluster together the holdings of  each of  the members in the 
telecommunications sector in Spain68. 
Telefónica, with its mobile subsidiary, subordinated the entry into the European market to the 
profitability of  the investment, along with the reduction of  risks through the alliance with 
technology and financial partners that would limit the financial exposure of  the company, 
without losing control over the operations. In the search for allies, the choice of  local partners 
took on great importance69. However, it must be said that the entry strategy took on a different 
shape according to the countries it planned to enter. 
Telefónica decided to abandon the British auction due to the high price reached and the fact 
that BBVA, its partner in a strategic alliance, was opposed to any further bids by the 
operator70. Following the British episode, the main European governments remodeled the 
license concession system, requiring candidates to adapt to the new circumstances. 
The German market represented both an opportunity and a challenge, because the experience 
already acquired in other countries could provide a privileged position for the launch of  its 
operations. Telefónica began to assume positions in the IP network and Internet portal segment, 
thanks to its entry in mediaWays and in Terra Lycos, the second largest IP network and Internet 
portal operator in Germany, respectively, as well as in Iobox, the mobile Internet portal acquired 
by Terra Mobile (Rozas, 2003, p. 45; Telefónica, Informe Anual, 2000, p. 80; PCWorld, October 1, 
2000)71. To compete in Germany, Telefónica, now without the support of  important banking and 
infrastructure companies (BBVA, La Caixa, Banco Zaragozano), joined forces with the operator 
66 Telefónica and BBVA created the Monitoring Committee for their alliance with collegial senior management (Emilio Ybarra and 
Francisco González for BBVA and J. Villalonga for Telefónica) and ten members distributed evenly. A coordination unit was also 
created	for	the	work	groups,	under	the	direction	of	Pedro	Luis	Uriarte	and	Luis	Martín	Bustamante.	The	first	results	were	two	
collaborative agreements related to the new economy. In line with the alliance’s approach, the partners began negotiations 
with other potential candidates with a compatible strategy. On its own, BBVA singed an agreement with Logista, Terra and the 
German	group	Bertelsmann	to	develop	e-commerce	and	logistical	operations	derived	from	it	(CNMV,	Significant	event,	6.622,	
4/6/2000).
67 To determine the possible effects of the BBVA alliance on competition, the Ministry of Economy opened a case that was dismissed 
by the Competition Defense Service (El País, February 24 and May 24, 2001).
68	 The	consortium,	worth	3.2	trillion	pesetas,	invited	Banco	Santander	Central	Hispano	(BSCH)	to	join	(El País, April 7, 2000). Shortly 
afterwards,	it	was	subjected	to	restructuring.
69 Telefónica, Informe Anual,	2000,	p.	80;	CNMV,	Significant	event,	6.603,	3/31/2000.
70	 CNMV,	Significant	event,	6.709,	4/17/2000.
71 Creation of Terra Lycos (Jelassi and Enders, 2005, p. 401). The auction design allowed each eligible participant to bid for two or 
three blocks of 5 megahertz of the spectrum, out of a total of 60 megahertz up for sale (RCR Wireless, May 1, 2000). A bidder 
could win two or three portions, which meant that there would be between four and six winners. Seven bidders participated in 
the	auction,	the	largest	of	which	fought	tooth	and	nail	for	three	lots	and	the	result	of	the	fifth	winner,	but	the	two	strongest	
potential participants refused to abandon the auction. At the last moment, in light of the pressure from the capital markets, 
the largest holders agreed to reduce their demands from three to two lots and to end the auction with two new participants 
(Cramton, 2013, p. 6).
20
Harvard Deusto Business Research. Volume VIII. Issue 1. Pages 3-30. ISSN: 2254-6235
Harvard Deusto Business Research
 
Technological change, opening and internationalization of Spanish telecommunications. The transition... 
In the 1990s, 
the expansion 
of  Telefónica 
throughout 
Europe was 
very limited,  
as it lacked  
any broad 
implementation 
in the area.  
The situation 
changed after 
2000, with the 
acquisition of  
UMTS licenses 
in several 
European 
countries.
Orange and the Finnish company Sonera (Xfera’s partner)72. In August 2000, the 3G Group, 
57.4% of  which was owned by Telefónica Móviles and 42.6% by the Finnish company Sonera, 
obtained one of  the six UMTS licenses in Germany through the instrumental company Marabu, 
with a cost of  €8.471 billion (Official Journal of  the European Communities, C 305/8, 10/25/2000)73. 
Unlike the preferred auction processes in the United Kingdom or Germany, the French government 
brought out four third-generation mobile telephony licenses to be awarded in a tender process 
(‘sousmission comparative’ or ‘beauty contest’) that rewarded different qualitative criteria, such as the scale 
and speed of  deployment of  the network. To the despair of  the authorities, who counted on an 
avalanche of  candidates, only the three existing mobile operators entered the tender (France Télécom, 
SFR [Vivendi] and Bouygues Telecom, along with Telecom Italia). Other groups, among them the 
American MCI Worldcom group, the Swedish Tele2 and Telia, the Australian One.tel and the British 
Virgin merely studied an offer74. While not an operator, Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux considered 
participating along with several possible candidates for a license, including the Dutch company KPN, 
Telefónica and the Canadian company TIW. The Spanish operator decided to join the project in a 
holding with the capacity to incorporate one or more minority partners, and a shareholding of  40%75. 
However, the great alliance that was negotiating opted for the Dutch company KPN, as we will see. 
Both companies clearly understood that UMTS was vital for their future on the old continent76. The 
ST3G consortium resulting from the agreement with Suez decided to withdraw from the auction due 
to the excessively high cost of  the license and the large amounts to be invested. Others followed suit 
(Bouygues Telecom), and so only liza France Télécom and SFR were left. Next, Telefónica 
demonstrated its interest in the two UMTS licenses that were left to be assigned, as did the Japanese 
company NTT DoCoMo and Deutsche Telekom77. 
Access to Italy took place through an agreement with the telecommunications service partner 
ACEA to participate jointly in the tender awarding five UMTS licenses. The auction 
72	 CNMV,	Significant	event,	21.979,	4/27/2000;	El Mundo, May 7, 2000. 
73 Other sources (Computerworld, August 18, 2000) indicate costing variants: 1.4 trillion pesetas (€8.409 billion); a return rate of 22-
23%	was	expected,	with	a	50/50%	initial	debt-capital	structure	(CNMV,	Significant	event,	24.278,	8/18/2000);	the	other	successful	
bidders were T-Mobil, Mannesmann, E-Plus, Mobil Com and Viag Interkom (Little, 2001, p. 5). According to some specialists, the 
purchase	of	the	UMTS	license	in	Germany,	among	others,	did	not	produce	financial	gains	(Berne	and	Pogorel,	2004,	p.	13).
74 La Tribune, October 20, 2008; RCR Wireless News, June 12, 2000. In the French tender, all the bidders committed to paying an 
initial spectrum quota of €4.95 billion (Hocepied and Held, 2011, pp. 26-30).
75 Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux (SLdE), a candidate that had repeatedly failed in mobile telephone bids in France, was well-positioned 
to win one of the four licenses in play. SLdE transferred a 10% holding in ST3G to the Groupe Arnault, member of the FirstMark 
Communications consortium, the national radio local loop operator (L’Usine Nouvelle, 2.757, 11/23/2000). The communication by 
SLdE was estimated to be worth 40 billion francs (€6 billion), more than 15% of the group’s revalued assets. Alongside SLdE in the 
communication were Lyonnaise du Câble (50.1%), the television channel M6 (35.5%), the TPS satellite (25% directly and 25% through 
M6) and the cable channel Paris Première (54% directly and 11% through M6). The media reminded that Telefónica had its Internet 
company	Terra	Networks,	with	a	market	cap	of	around	€26	billion,	30%	of	the	total	value	of	its	parent	company	(La Tribune, October 
20, 2008; Le Monde, February 1, 2000). Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux maintained a presence in Spain through Tractebel.
76	 CNMV,	Significant	event,	21.979,	4/27/2000;	El Mundo, May 7, 2000. By 1996, there were 400,000 mobile telephones in Spain 
and	six	years	later,	this	figure	reached	31	million	(Senate-commission,	October	1,	2002,	329,	p.	5).	Telefónica	had	twenty	million	
mobile telephone subscribers around the world in 2000. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Spain lagged behind the large EU 
countries	in	terms	of	investments	in	telecommunications.	The	expansive	profile	of	mobile	telephony	in	the	country	resembled	
that of France during the second half of the 1990s (Girard and Gruber, 1996, pp. 18-19).
77 Économies et sociétés, 37, 2003, p. 5; Wireless, February 2001, p. 5; Telefónica (2001), p. 12; Clubic, February 2, 2001; El 
País, December 11, 2000. Each of the successful candidates in the French process was required to pay €4.950 billion (823.61 
billion pesetas) per license, so that the overall amount of the process reached €19.8 billion (3.29 trillion pesetas). Sources from 
Suez Lyonnaise indicated that their alliance with Telefónica was limited for the moment to France, although it did not rule out 
participating in the UMTS license concession in Belgium with the Spanish operator (ComputerWorld, August 23, 2000). The French 
government	sought	resources	to	continue	to	finance	retirements	and	the	state	deleveraging	process;	in	the	opinion	of	some	
experts,	the	French	government,	judging	from	what	could	rationally	be	anticipated,	simply	reproduced	the	probable	results	of	an	
auction (Curien, 2002, p. 152).
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underscored the appearance of  alliances of  operators from other countries who had arrived in 
the market; we are referring to the axis formed by Telefónica/Sonera, partners in a UMTS 
system in Italy78. But the vehicle of  entry was the IPSE 2000 consortium, of  which Telefónica 
Móviles owned 39.3%, Sonera held 19% and Atlanet and Banco di Roma had an identical 
percentage. In November, the consortium obtained one of  the two 2x15+5 MHz UMTS 
licenses (the other three were 2x10+5 MHz) for an overall amount of  €3.27 billion79. The 
“winners” bore the burden of  $7.7 billion in payment per license and at least another $8 billion 
in investments in an enormous and expensive telephony network, along with a heavy debt, even 
though the only thing they received in exchange was permission to compete in a market in 
which earnings were far off  and hypothetical (Chorafas, 2016, p. 126).
In the case of  Austria and Switzerland, Telefónica obtained both UMTS licenses for an amount 
of  €117 and €33 million, respectively. The British lesson on high prices led to the emergence 
of  price reduction strategies through cooperation in offers in other countries (Van Damme, 
2000, pp. 4-8)80. This happened in Switzerland, where Telefónica repeated the consortium 
formula in an alliance with Sonera and the Australian company One.Tel (Team 3G), which 
ultimately left the Spanish company standing alone. The low revenue resulting from the Swiss 
auction was due to several circumstances. To begin with, it occurred late as compared to the 
others, and was further characterized by a lower number of  bidders as the result of  withdrawals 
and mergers. Four of  the nine qualified bidders withdrew from the proceedings, while two of  
those remaining announced merger plans a few minutes before the auction81. Finally, the price 
78 Telefónica had interests in the group through its 34% package in the Atlanet data division, the lead group of Acea that previously 
had	control	over	Ipse;	in	Atlanet,	Telefonica	Data	and	Acea	joined	the	Fiat	group	and	the	group	belonging	to	the	Agnelli	Ifil	family 
(Total Telecom, August 23, 2000). 
79 Official Journal of the European Communities	C	349/7,	6-12-2000;	CNMV,	Significant	event,	21.717,	4/14/2000;	Total Telecom, 
August 23, 2000. The chronology indicates August 23 and October as the dates when the IPSE 2000 consortium was founded and 
one of the two UMTS licenses in Italy was awarded, respectively (Telefónica, 2001, p. 12; Telefónica, Informe Anual, 2000, p. 
82). ACEA, leader in the electricity and water sector, provided telecommunications services in Rome and Lazio, in association 
with	Telefónica.	Other	figures	on	the	holdings	of	the	partners	in	the	IPSE	2000	consortium:	Telefónica	through	Telefónica	
InterContinental (39.25%), Sonera (19%), Atlanet (12%), Banca di Roma (10%), Goldenegg (4.8%), Xera (5%), Planet Mobile (0.5%), 
Falck, along with a group of Italian municipalities (3%) (Newswire, September 11, 2000). ACEA-Telefónica SpA, subsidiary of the 
Telefónica Group in Italy, announced its intent to merge with Telexis, a subsidiary of the FIAT Group to provide business services, 
particularly Internet-related services. The early withdrawal of Blu, the lowest and weakest bidder, lowered the price of the 
operation and triggered a complaint by the Italian government against Blu for alleged violation of the rules (Heuvelhof et al., 
2009, p. 129). Consortium of companies, the most important of which were: Autostrade, a state SpA company, had control over 
32%; British Telecom owned 20%; Benetton had 9%; Mediaset, the private Italian company in the television market, and Bnl, one 
of the largest Italian banks, had 7% (Bartolini, 2005, p. 10).
80 Half of the expected revenue was obtained in the ascending price auction for UMTS licenses in Austria, halted twice by the 
government for possible collusion, which was expressly prohibited (Sokol, 2001). Licensees in Austria: T-Mobile Austria, GmbH, 
3G	Mobile	Telecommunications,	GmbH,	Mobilkom	Austria	AG	(subsidiary	of	Telekom	Austria),	Hutchison	3G	Austria,	GmbH,	ONE,	
GmbH	and	TRA	3G	Mobilfunk,	GmbH	(PRESS	RELEASE	No	44/07,	Judgment	of	the	Court	of	Justice	in	Case	C-284/04	and	Case	
C-369/04 T-Mobile Austria, GmbH and Others v Republik Österreich, Hutchison 3G UK, Ltd and Others v Commissioners of Customs 
& Excise; The award by the state of 3G mobile telecom, CJE/07/44, June 26, 2007). The historic operators had the advantage 
of the pre-existing 2G networks, some of the components of which could be used in the 3G system. As a matter of fact, the 
potential participants had strong incentives to partner with the holders, which is what eventually occurred (Sokol, 2001). During 
the	summer	of	2000,	Mobilkom	Austria	AG	deployed	the	first	comprehensive	GPRS	network	in	the	world,	the	packet	switching	data	
support medium for GSM (Taferner and Bonek, 2002, p. 3).
81 Network World, September 4, 2000; Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2000; Sokol, 2001, p. 24. The Swiss regulator halted the auction 
when the number of bidders for the four licenses was reduced to only four after the announcement of the merger of the Swiss 
mobile	telephone	companies	diAx	and	Sunrise.	Telefónica	expressed	its	displeasure	and	rejected	the	merger	of	the	operators	
as an excuse (SwissInfo,	November	26,	2000).	The	auction	resumed	in	response	to	the	pressure	from	businesses	and	the	public	
(Gruber, 2005, p. 257). In 2006, The Federal Communications Commission (ComCom) revoked without compensation the unused 
3G	Mobile	AG	UMTS	license	for	a	violation	of	the	coverage	conditions	by	the	licensee.	At	the	same	time,	ComCom	rejected	the	3G	
Mobile requests related to the transfer of the license to one or more existing UMTS licensees (ComCom, April 13, 2006).
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was affected by the new financial situation that the UMTS auctions had helped promote, i.e., 
generating an enormous debt that made it more difficult to later win licenses82. 
Not everything was a success, and even when Telefónica did succeed, there was a delay between 
the priority bid for the main EU markets (the UK, France, Germany and Italy) and the 
effective yields, which left out the UK and France. Furthermore, the vast amount of  financial 
resources required to set up the networks and implement the service imposed an obligatory 
selection of  objectives83. This explains why Telefónica bowed out of  the auction for five third-
generation licenses in Poland, in spite of  having originally considered this market as strategic 
and even having taken the first steps with the creation of  a consortium, along with the 
construction company Ferrovial, Futuro.com and the local company Polpager. A multi-million 
euro debt, fueled by investments in licenses in Italy and Germany, made expense containment 
recommendable. In addition to the financial exposure were some especially onerous conditions, 
among them the subordination to local capital and the concentration of  the payment in the 
first fourteen years of  a license granted for twenty years84. 
Telefónica was knocked out of  the tender in Sweden, one of  the most advanced countries in 
the world in mobile communications and Internet, a historic position left over from its 
significance in the early moments of  telephony85. The Scandinavian country sought the largest 
number of  licensees to best meet the need for consumer services and ensure competition 
among the 3G operators (Larsson, 2008, p. 24). Telefónica competed with nine international 
groups, according to the well-known scheme of  a consortium with local partners, i.e., through 
the Reach Out Mobile AB consortium, made up by the Finnish operator Sonera and the 
Swedish investment fund Industri Kapital. The competent authority evaluated the proposals in 
a double phase, based on two sets of  criteria: financial capacity/technical and commercial 
viability in the first phase and coverage in relation to the area and population and the 
deployment speed of  the networks in the second phase. The concessions were granted to the 
Swedish operators Europolitan, HIG3, Tele2 (Netcom) and the Orange Sverige consortium. 
The Reach Out Mobile AB consortium was ruled out for the lack of  “technical reliability,” but 
in all reality, it was due to the lower level of  commitment in terms of  building base stations and 
investment. The decision was challenged before the Tribunal, alleging that it was improper to 
reject the application for possible problems in the project organization and network 
construction, since any license holder would face identical problems (Andersson, Hultén and 
Valiente, 2005, pp. 577-593; Curwen, 2002, p. 82; El País, December 17, 2000)86. 
82	 In	just	five	years,	the	net	debt	of	mobile	telephony	companies	nearly	quintupled:	it	soared	from	€7.4	billion	in	1998	to	€36	
billion	in	2002	(Preissl	and	Müller,	2007,	p.	447).	The	specialized	financial	press	insisted	on	this	runaway	debt	for	licenses	(The 
Economist, May 3, 2001). Some assigned greater responsibility in terms of debt to the imprudent acquisitions and the general/
creative accounting than to the license fees, no matter how burdensome they were (The Guardian, August 27, 2002).
83 Conversation between Luis López-van Dam and the author about Telefónica’s globalization process, 4/18 and 5/13/2013.
84	 No	doubt	a	reflection	of	the	harsh	conditions,	the	number	of	candidates	was	limited	to	the	three	existing	mobile	telephony	
operators, which forced the ministry to cancel the tender. Telefónica advocated four UMTS licenses (OECD, 2002, p. 31). Futuro.
com abandoned the consortium created with Telefónica, considering the conditions proposed by the Spanish operator to be 
unacceptable (Bakier, 12/1/2000; Baquía,	12/4/2000);	Polpager	joined	the	Elektrim	Telekomunikacja	holding;	Polska	Telefonia	
Cyfrowa (PTC), leader during the GSM era, continued as such from then on.
85	 CNMV,	Significant	event,	8.793,	9/1/2000.
86 Telefónica InterContinental had a minority share in the consortium (20%) as opposed to 45% by the Sonera Corporation and 35% 
by	Industri	Kapital	(Telefónica,	2001,	p.	12).	Sweden,	with	three	second-generation	mobile	telephone	operators,	enjoyed	a	
mobile telephony penetration rate of nearly 65%; to participate in the tender, candidates needed to pay 100,000 Swedish kroner 
(1,940,000 pesetas) to cover administrative expenses and the successful bidder undertook to pay the state a 0.15% royalty from 
its income until 2015, when the license expires (NetworkWorld, September 4 and December 15, 2000). The Swedish tender failed 
in its attempt to effectively resolve the users’ aspirations and Sweden failed miserably in applying the ambitious coverage criteria 
(Welin, 2006, p. 2).
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6.  The companies: from successful bidders to mobile network 
operators 
The introduction of  third-generation UMTS in Europe was delayed by the financial crisis in 
telecommunications due to the astronomic costs of  licenses for mobile telephony operators. 
The enormous investments required to build the infrastructure were combined with serious 
financial problems in the sector, with negative effects on the deployment of  the 3G networks 
in the area (Palmberg, 2006, p. 95)87. 
Our analysis should go beyond merely listing the concessions, which is a very common trend, 
and delve briefly in how they operated. We will do this for several countries, by way of  
example, but not without first indicating that two years after the purchase of  these expensive 
licenses, no operator was providing UMTS services. The relative loss in share value varied from 
a minimum of  55.4% for Telefónica to a maximum of  95.6% for KPN (Columbus, 2004, p. 4). 
We have the self-assessment of  Telefónica regarding its early actions in Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland and Austria. Since day one, the operator channeled the management of  the 
companies holding 3G mobile telephony licenses to take advantage of  the synergies and scale 
economies, with limited financial exposure. Throughout 2001, it negotiated the supply and 
finance contracts with suppliers, with noticeable progress in the interconnection agreements 
with the other operators to share part of  the network infrastructure needed for UMTS 
(Telefónica, Informe Anual, 2001, p. 40).
Very soon and in full agreement with the explosive nature of  the business, the situation 
changed. The market conditions (severe downward corrections in the estimates of  the demand 
for 3G services), technology (once again, a delay in the availability of  UMTS technology), 
competition (the emergence of  barriers to the entry of  new candidates due to an increase in 
penetration in the European markets of  already established operators), along with financial and 
regulatory aspects pushed Telefónica to revise its business model and redefine its short- and 
medium-term objectives in Europe. During the last quarter of  the year, Telefónica totally 
eliminated exposure in three European countries (Germany, Austria and Switzerland)88.
If  we analyze by country, in Germany, the deployment of  UMTS was delayed by the lack of  
terminals, among other reasons. Based on agreements for roaming and the exchange of  
infrastructures with another operator (Deutsche Telekom AG) and with the authorization of  
the German regulator, Telefónica’s 3G Group debuted in late 2001 as a virtual mobile operator 
(VMO), with GSM/GPRS technology. Later, in light of  the operating and financial results, 
Telefónica Móviles realized that the results of  the 3G Group in its first stage were noticeably 
distant from its original objectives. These deviations materially affected the expected 
profitability of  the company in the context of  an important deceleration of  growth of  the 
87	 The	massive	indebtedness	of	the	European	operators	with	the	banks	and	financial	markets	unleashed	a	vicious	circle:	downward	
valuation of the operators, successive increase in the debt and capital cost, negative impact on the investment capacity and 
profitability,	and	the	crash	of	the	operators’	stock	market	value.	Meanwhile,	in	the	issue	of	obligations	for	2000,	Telefónica	was	
generally positioned below the main European operators (including the 64.7% of Vodafone, the 23.9% of Deutsche Telekom and 
the 59.64% of British Telecom), so they suffered from less negative effects (Didier and Lorenzi, 2002, pp. 86-87).
88 The new valuations obtained from the plans in Germany, Austria, Italy and Switzerland required accounting for extraordinary 
provisions, attributable to the recovery of assets, and providing for restructuring expenses. It thus made possible a strong 
generation	of	cash	flow	in	Telefónica	Móviles	and	flexibility	to	optimize	its	strategy.	These	measures	were	pioneering	in	nature	in	
Europe and well-received by the market; in 2002, the investment in wireless telephony fell by 50.7%. The extraordinarily negative 
net results caused by the recovery of assets, added to the UMTS restructuring expenses in Europe were estimated at €4.9582 
billion (Telefónica, Informe Anual, 2002, pp. 48-49 and 214).
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in Europe.
wireless market in Germany. As a result, Telefónica Móviles and its partner Sonera completely 
halted the commercial operations of  its Quam brand in light of  the very low expectations of  
generating value for the shareholders of  the 3G consortium. Another telecommunications 
victim, Quam declared bankruptcy, no doubt explained by the costs of  technology investments 
and the UMTS license89. 
In Italy, the IPSE 2000 shareholders opted in 2002 to postpone the launch of  commercial 
operations and to restructure the company. In Switzerland and Austria, no pertinent commercial 
agreements had been signed, including 2G roaming agreements, network distribution 
agreements and supplier financing. With all of  this, in Austria, it did not rule out a possible 
alliance though a takeover of  a UMTS operator or cooperation with other UMTS suppliers. The 
acquisition formula or the alternative of  cooperation were also considered for other countries, 
such as Germany, Switzerland and Italy (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003, p. 88; 
Lemstra and Melody, 2014, p. 175; Picot and Doeblin, 2013, p. 95; Telecompaper, April 2, 2003)90. 
In the first half  of  2002, the general UMTS market conditions suffered revealing changes from 
the quadruple competitive, technological, financial and regulatory perspective. These changes 
obligated Telefónica Móviles to revise its European strategy. To start with, it had to assume the 
clear resistance by the European Commission to any relaxation of  regulations91. The delay in 
the technological development of  UMTS suppliers, as well as the uncertain competitive 
capacities of  UMTS in terms of  the existing technologies caused a constant delay in 
commercially viable UMTS technology, which did not foster a fast and large-scale accumulation 
of  3G networks. As a result, the operators focused on building their 3G networks in the same 
areas – the major metropolitan areas of  each country – to meet the licensing requirements and 
their own commercial needs, in such a way that the network distribution agreements lost 
effectiveness. In a nutshell, the important cost savings derived from network distribution 
agreements were reduced to nothing, while the financial resources necessary for network 
deployment increased92. 
The general delay in the introduction of  a commercially viable UMTS technology was also due 
to the lack of  UMTS mobile terminals, which were reduced to a small number of  prototypes 
with technical problems, as well as problems with the hardware and software of  the network 
89 DW Akademie, October 14, 2002. 
90 Bartolacci and Powell (2012, p. 180) did indicate roaming agreements in Austria. GPRS (general packet radio service or 2.5G), 
the natural evolution of GSM to 2.5G, tolerated voice and high-speed data transmission. A VMO is a mobile operator that, lacking 
a network, purchases capacity wholesale from operators owning physical networks and then sells it to its customers. Telefónica 
chose	NavisRadius	(TM)	software	from	Lucent	Technologies	to	manage	its	new	UMTS	network,	as	well	as	its	GSM	and	GPRS	
networks (UMTS Forum, January-March 2004).
91 Concerning regulation, see Faulhaber, Madden and Petchey, 2012, pp. 247-267.
92	 Regarding	the	combination	of	delays	in	3G	network	deployment	and	financial	problems,	see	Louta	et	al.	(2003).	Among	the	
technical problems of 3G telephones and the base stations were the high energy consumption and increased software content, as 
these were in fact pocket computers. The demand for hybrid telephones (3G telephones capable of reverting back to 2G) made it 
even	more	difficult	to	manufacture	third-generation	terminals	and	meant	delays	in	their	availability.	The	financial	repercussions	
of	the	delay	included	the	deterioration	of	the	share	price	and	the	added	difficulties	to	raise	money	due	to	the	negative	weight	
of the debt on their credit ratings. The threat of more debt hovered over the operators, particularly the new participants. In 
the device manufacturers, the operators found various ways to alleviate the harshness of the 3G deployment conditions. One 
consisted	of	”supplier	financing,”	in	which	they	loaned	money	to	client	operators.	Loaning	up	to	200%	of	the	cost	of	the	hardware	
meant that the suppliers accepted risks, especially in loans to new operators yet to generate any revenue. Some of them 
compensated the delay in the 3G launch by becoming resellers of the existing 2G networks belonging to other companies. This 
strategy provided short-term revenue and allowed the new participants to gradually introduce their 3G infrastructure by offering 
their subscribers hybrid devices. This implied as a logical conclusion “network exchanges” (network-sharing), in which two or 
more operators agreed to share part of their 3G infrastructure to speed up the deployment of their 3G networks (The Economist, 
May 3, 2001).
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equipment. This general delay permitted the historic operators to soften the ‘migration’ to the 
UMTS technology and lifted entry barriers for new operators. The delay situated the main 
European markets on the brink of  saturation and hindered new operators in their attempt to 
capture lesser value customers or users who were still without service, even for those who used 
the preceding technologies, i.e., GSM. In spite of  the delay, Telefónica gave validity to the 
UMTS technology as long as there was a small number of  operators in each country. The 
difficulty by new operators to gain access to mature markets and a level of  revenue per user 
that was lower than previously estimated underscored the importance of  a minimum market 
quota to neutralize the cost pressures and achieve the required performance93. 
In short, the uncertainty about the commercial reality of  the UMTS technology and the 
evolution of  the services that it needed to support made it advisable for Telefónica Móviles to 
revise downward the demand for 3G services. To prepare the financial statements for 2001, 
Telefónica Móviles had compared the accounting value of  the licenses to the financial 
projections included in the business plan and considered the investments made so far to be 
recoverable. In July 2002, the company agreed to revise the value reflected on its balance sheet 
for its assets in Germany, Austria, Italy and Switzerland. According to this examination, the 
financial statements on June 30, 2002 incorporated an extraordinary net provision in the 
amount of  €4.902 billion, of  which 310 million corresponded to the provision for restructuring 
expenses in these countries and €4.592 billion to the provision for the restructuring of  assets 
(tangibles and intangibles) allocable to Telefónica Móviles (Telefónica, 2002, pp. 4 and 6; 
Khosrowpour, 2004, pp. 132-133)94. 
The first transfer of  the UMTS spectrum between companies in Europe did not take long to 
arrive. In December 2003, Telefónica Móviles España sold to Mobilkom Austria 
Aktiengesellschaft & Co KG all of  its share in 3G Mobile Telecommunications, GmbH, the 
Austrian subsidiary of  Telefónica Móviles España, holder of  the UMTS license, for €13.65 
million95. 
7. Conclusion 
This article offers a succinct report on the implementation in Europe of  the third generation 
of  mobile telephony and its arrival in Spain from a multidisciplinary perspective. The work 
sheds light on the effective operation of  the European telecommunications market, in which 
certain supranational regulations were combined with the maintenance of  prerogatives in the 
hands of  member states for the application of  said guidelines. 
In Europe, the third generation of  mobile telephony was introduced under a common 
technical standard and regulation, but according to specific conditions imposed by the nation-
93 We followed very closely the Securities and Exchange Commission (2003), p. 89. Although technically very different from the 
GSM, the economic and competitive development of UMTS could depend closely on the previous GSM market structures (Kruse, 
2004,	p.	185).	Telefónica	Móviles	España	obtained	two	GSM	900	licenses	for	fifteen	years,	which	ended	in	2010	and	2020,	one	DCS-
1800 license for 25 years, which ends in 2023, and a UMTS license for twenty years, which expires in 2020. DCS (Digital Cellular 
Service) 1800 was an implementation of the GSM standard that operated on the 1800 MHz frequency (Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2005, p. 36).
94 Independent experts advised Telefónica Móviles in the evaluation of the business plans of the Group operators in Europe 
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003, p. 87). The losses generated in 2000-2003 have been estimated at between €1 and 
€2	trillion;	the	sum	of	€9.1	billion	gave	Telefónica	the	fifth	position	among	the	companies	with	the	greatest	expense	on	UMTS	
licenses (the so-called gorillas), behind Vodafone, British Telecom, France Télécom and Deutsche Telekom; immediately after it 
on	the	list	was	KPN	and	Sonera	(Columbus,	2004,	pp.	2-4).
95 Telefónica, Informe Anual, 2003, pp. 168 and 254; Investegate, December 24, 2003; El Periódico, December 24, 2003.
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states. This double reality shaped a map with a certain level of  diversity and the results varied 
from one country to another. The evidence provided indicates that the regulatory activity in 
assigning the scarce resource that was the radio spectrum determined to a large extent the 
future of  mobile telephony, in contrast to the feelings of  some contemporary analysts. 
Furthermore, the strategy of  the network operator companies played an important role in the 
configuration of  this varied scene and promised the deployment of  the upcoming generations 
of  mobile telephony. Spain presents a case of  great interest, in particular due to the late 
presence of  the telecommunications monopoly and for being a country not included among 
the ten largest telecommunications markets, but with an operating company that was among 
them, as clearly indicated in the reports from the U.S. International Trade Commission in 2010. 
This position and the business performance give us a clear picture of  everything that happened 
with the UMTS. How was it possible that Telefónica anticipated the devaluation of  its assets, 
lowering the business expectations and adjusting its balance, and all of  this while facing lower 
losses than the rest? The simplest response is that by lacking the technological capital 
developed and accumulated in 3G, Telefónica did not run the risk of  losing it, and therefore 
had not generated any expectations as to its profitability associated with its innovative capacity. 
Rather Telefónica, with less debt than the other large European operators, stood out for its 
enormous financial power, explainable by its status as a private monopoly with a significant 
public holding, sponsored by the government as a cog in the machinery of  development and 
economic intervention and also as an element in the political game as the CEO of  the 
company. When the auctions applied pressure in terms of  technology in order to capitalize the 
market potential over the short term without an adequate technological deployment in place, 
the most technologically powerful companies and consortia failed. The value of  their 
technological capacity was in fact devalued, but the profitability of  Telefónica was not as 
strongly affected. 
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